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Abstract: Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limarí Valley of Chile to test extant 
theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of 
availability, were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by 
protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions 
raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a 
substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received 
theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for 
market redesign.  
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Introduction 
In a thoughtful and influential introduction to experimental economics, Al Roth distinguishes 
among experiments according to the conversation they belong to and the audience they are 
intended to persuade (Roth 1995).  Experiments that “Speak to Theorists” test a developed 
formal model while those “Searching for Facts” investigate variables for which existing theory 
has little to say.  Experiments that “Whisper in the Ears of Princes” enhance the dialogue 
between researchers and policymakers, for example, to shed light on the impact of a change in 
market organization.  We conduct a field experiment that makes contributions to the first and 
third of Roth’s categories by studying farmers’ willingness-to-pay for water in the Limarí Valley 
of Chile.  The experiments speak to theorists by providing fresh evidence on the properties of 
the right-to-choose - or bidder’s choice - auction, which was shown to raise more revenue than 
bilateral bargaining in a seminal field study (Ashenfelter and Genosove 1992).  Secondarily, the 
experiments whisper to princes by providing fresh insights on price discovery, and help identify 
opportunities to improve the performance of the market for water in Chile.  
   To achieve our primary objective the protocol introduces within-subject variation in the 
“type” of water for sale, which varies by reservoir source and time of delivery, and between-
subject variation in the auction institutions, which use sequential and right-to-choose allocation 
rules.   In the sequential auction treatment (SEQ), goods are sold in an exogenously determined 
order.  For the right-to-choose (RTC) institution, the ‘good’ for sale is the right to choose an 
item from the heterogeneous group of goods that remain in a particular auction phase.  The SEQ 
auction serves as a control for the RTC institution in our study, as it has in previous 
experimental and theoretical work.  Burguet (2007) has shown that when risk-averse bidders 
differ in their preference orderings for the goods, the right to choose auction will lead to higher 
bids and revenues.  However, laboratory studies using induced values provide mixed evidence 
on the importance of risk aversion.  Goeree, Plott and Wooders (2004) report results that support 
Burguet’s model.  They find that the RTC raises more revenue than the SEQ benchmark and that 
an estimate of a common constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter yields both a 
plausible value and a better fit to their data than a risk-neutral model.  Eliaz, Offerman, and 
Schotter (2008) introduce an RTC variant that should raise less revenue than SEQ but find that it 
also generates more revenue. As a result, they argue that risk attitudes cannot entirely explain   4
their data.   
Our study extends the previous research in several important ways.  First, we bridge a 
gap between the laboratory evidence just cited and uncontrolled field data since subjects bid for 
a commodity – water for agricultural use - that is important to them outside the experimental 
setting.  In the lexicon of Harrison and List (2004), our study is a framed field experiment.
3 The 
benefit of the framed field experiment is that the data generating process is tied to the field 
setting of interest, but the use of controlled variation and randomization, as in laboratory studies, 
supports causal inference (List 2006). 
Second, we elicit individual risk attitudes independently of bidding behavior using a 
multiple price list (MPL) protocol based on the design of Holt and Laury (2002).  The 
exogenous elicitation of risk attitudes for each individual creates a closer link to the theoretical 
literature than in the previous laboratory studies.  Evidence in many populations of 
heterogeneity of risk attitudes suggests that the elicitation should be important empirically 
(Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008).   We also elicit time preferences using an MPL protocol in order 
to control for the temporal differences in water types.  Finally, we survey respondents to capture 
additional demographic and market experience variables that may influence bidding behavior.
4   
To implement the framed field experiment we build on an important strand of 
experimental research that exports incentive-compatible mechanisms – studied in the lab with 
induced values – into field settings to elicit and study homegrown values.  Applications have 
been prominent in studies of willingness-to-pay for food characteristics, such as genetic 
modification, traceability, or organic production (examples include Dickinson and Bailey 2002, 
Lusk et al. 2001, Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004).  A virtue of these studies is the use of 
salient incentives, thereby addressing concerns about hypothetical bias in the stated preference 
literature.
5  Mechanisms that have been used to elicit homegrown values include individual 
choice designs and auctions of various types, in both research and natural settings such as retail 
outlets (Rutstrom 1998, Harrison, Harstad, and Rustrom 2004).  In our study we implement a 
                                                 
3 A framed field experiment has field context “in either the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can 
use” (Harrison and List 2004).  
4 Alevy and Price (2009), to our knowledge, are the only previous researchers to study the RTC auction in the field. 
They find no evidence that the RTC results in increased bids or revenues relative to the SEQ benchmark. The 
difference between their results and ours are a subject for future research. 
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sealed-bid, second-price auction; choosing the former due to concerns about bidder privacy, and 
the latter to provide a clean counterfactual to address the theoretical question, since with the 
second price rule, risk attitudes play no role in the SEQ treatment.  
The elicitation of risk and time preferences along with bids for water allows us to cleanly 
test hypotheses on the performance of the RTC institution.  Our results yield strong evidence in 
support of the extant theory on the importance of risk aversion.  In addition to this primary 
result, the experimental approach makes several contributions.  First, although market 
institutions for water in the Limarí Valley have been in use – and been studied - for many years, 
our understanding of price discovery and price dispersion remains tentative.  The elicitation of 
homegrown values yields fresh information, since we observe underlying reservation values for 
all bidders, including those who are extramarginal traders in the marketplace.  Further, by 
manipulating the characteristics of the goods our protocol allows us to observe heterogeneity in 
preferences across types, providing insight into the extent to which thin markets for water might 
be thickened through alternative trading instruments and institutions.  The experiments thus 
contribute to a longer-term project that investigates the reorganization of the market for water, 
including the possible implementation of an electronic marketplace, and thus fit comfortably in 
Roth’s “whispering” category.   
Water Law and the Study Area 
According to the Chilean Water Code, approved in 1981 and modified in 2005, water rights are 
private, separable from land holdings, and tradable.  Trade can occur through a variety of 
instruments that include the permanent transfer of rights, long-term leases, and spot market 
transactions for water used in the current growing season.   Our field experiments focus on the 
spot market since these are the transactions observed most frequently both in current and 
historical data in the area under study (Cristi, et al. 2002).     
The study area is in an irrigated zone in the Limarí River Basin in Chile`s Coquimbo Region 
(region IV) which is 472 kilometers north of the capital of Santiago.  The hydrologic system is 
primarily niveous, fed from the snow-covered Andes Mountains, with an average annual 
precipitation of only 140 mm.  Of the 60,000 irrigated hectares in the zone 40,000 hectares 
receive  water from three interconnected dams that form what is known as the Paloma System.      
Agricultural production in the Paloma System is diverse, with land planted in traditional crops 
such as maize, beans, and potatoes, horticultural crops (artichokes, peppers and tomatoes),   6
grains, pasture as well as valuable perennial crops such as avocados, export grapes and grapes 
used for pisco, a local liquor.  The perennial crops are grown mainly in the area below the dams. 
The farmer base is also diverse and consists of orchard owners, medium-sized farms, and a few 
large multinational fruit exporters.  
We study water users who rely on the Paloma System which has a storage capacity of one 
billion cubic meters and a sophisticated infrastructure that connects the different irrigation 
districts. Distribution of water among users is managed by the Water User Associations (WUAs) 
whose members are farmers from a specific river, canal or geographical area.  While the WUAs 
have legal status related to administration, they do not own water rights, which remain the 
property of the association’s members.  Water is distributed at the opening of the agricultural 
season in April, when each WUA receives a proportion of the water stored in the dams based on 
historical shares.  Members receive allotments from their WUA according to the number of 
water rights they hold.  Thus the amount of water contained in a right can vary from year to 
year.   In September, after the winter rainy season has concluded, it is possible that the amount 
of water associated with a right will be increased for all rights holders.   
Owners of rights can freely transact to reallocate the initial allocation and an active spot 
market has been facilitated by the flexible infrastructure and the efficient administration of the 
WUAs.  The spot market is active not only during drought periods, but also in seasons with 
“normal” water availability. In normal seasons, demand arises from structural motives 
associated with existing production technologies and plans. Farmers unable to satisfy their water 
requirements with their stock of water rights are potential buyers, while farmers that have more 
water rights than they need for their own production are potential sellers.   
Farmers that do not participate in the market in normal years may enter the market in drought 
years.  These farmers have higher marginal returns and demand water to stabilize output.
6  
Hearne and Easter (1995) have identified significant variation in marginal returns, estimating an 
average value for the marginal return to water at US$ 856.7 in the case of table grapes and US$ 
865.7 for the case of grapes used in pisco.  In contrast, marginal values for potatoes and peppers, 
two of the non-perennial crops in the basin are estimated at US$ 33.5 and US$317.5 
respectively.  Thus, stabilization demand comes from farmers with perennial crops such as 
                                                 
6 According to Howitt (1998) the stabilization motive counters deviations below mean allotments in drought years.    7
grapes which have higher marginal returns and significant costs associated with their 
maintenance. Some of these farmers may prefer to keep an overstock of rights, eliminating the 
need to participate in the spot market during drought years, and their decisions depend on their 
risk aversion and the alternative cost of the water rights. Suppliers of water are largely farmers 
with non-perennial crops who can modify their water consumption by adjusting their land use or 
by shifting to less water intensive crops (Zegarra, 2002).  
The size of the spot market depends, in part, on the amount of water distributed from the 
dams. The distribution decision is made by the Administration of the Paloma System which is 
required to ensure the availability of water for three years (including the current season). When 
the dams are full they contain one billion cubic meters and the annual distribution is 362 million 
cubic meters.
7  In dry years as little as 115 million cubic meters has been distributed.  The spot 
market has varied in size from 3.5% to 9.1% of the allocated supply in recent seasons, somewhat 
less than 12% estimated for the period 1995-2000 (Cristi et al. 2002).  
Trade in the spot market occurs through two institutions.    The primary market functions 
through the offices of the WUAs, where farmers can indicate trading interest by declaring offers 
to buy or sell. In drought years this system is supplemented by market activity in the Ovalle 
town square. In both cases, most negotiations are bilateral. There are also some water brokers, 
but they act largely as intermediaries in the water rights market and tend not to be active in the 
spot market (Palma, 2009). 
All water transactions must be reported to the appropriate WUA, who record the amount of 
water exchanged and make it available to the buyer.  There is no reporting requirement for 
prices, nor any formal mechanism for disseminating price information, which largely remains 
private information. Moreover, the quantities exchanged are not publicized by the WUAs.  Thus, 
although the spot market can be active there is little public information about price and quantity.  
These institutional arrangements highlight the need for analytical tools to better understand spot 
market performance.  
Using survey data from farmers Zegarra (2002) was able to generate a time series of spot 
market prices for the period 1994 to 1997. He reports that water prices in the spot market are 
                                                 
7 This exceeds the amount of one billion cubic meters in three years because it accounts for expected rain and snow 
in the coming winters.   8
highly variable, especially in dry years.  Zegarra (2002) suggests that the variance is due to 
transaction costs because he assumes that water is highly homogeneous resource for which one 
would not expect significant differences in quality or other attributes affecting prices.  
Zegarra (2002) focuses on the operation of the spot market in the Limarí Valley in the face of 
an extremely negative shock.  He found that the spot market for water solves differences in the 
marginal return of water among farmers, promoting the allocation of water from low value 
annual crops to high value permanent crops.  Nevertheless, he also shows that in the context of 
severe drought, the water market starts to be less effective in allocating the resource, with 
greater water price dispersion, due to inflexibility caused by a more concentrated farming 
activity on permanent crops. 
In addition to Zeggara’s (2002) study, previous work on the Limarí basin includes Hearne 
and Easter (1995); Hadjigeorgalis (2000 and 2004); Cristi, et al. 2002 and Cristi (2007).  Hearne 
and Easter (1995) estimate economic gains (net returns to society) and financial gains 
(individual net benefits) from water right transactions.  Hadjigeorgalis (2004) addresses the link 
between reservation values for water, risk aversion and uncertainty cost associated with 
stochastic water supply. Cristi, et al. (2002) describes water market activity in the Limarí Valley 
and measures the relative size of the spot market with respect to the market for water rights in 
terms of water exchanged. He also describes farmers` motives to participate in the markets for 
water. Cristi (2007) analyzes the factors that explain market transactions of water rights when 
there is also a spot market for water volumes, and shows that risk heterogeneity among farmers 
is critical to explaining those transactions.   
 
Theory and Evidence on the Right-to-Choose Auction 
The evidence from previous research that outcomes in the water market depend on the risk 
attitudes of participants helps shape our experimental design (Cristi 2007).  In this section we 
explore how risk attitudes are expected to affect bidding behavior in the auction institutions we 
implement in the field.  In the SEQ treatment, with heterogeneous goods and a second-price 
rule, bidding one’s value for each good is a dominant strategy.  In the RTC setting, bidding true 
value is the dominant strategy only in the final phase of the auction, and bids should be biased 
upwards in earlier phases if bidders are risk-averse.      9
       The impact of risk aversion in the RTC setting can be demonstrated with a two-bidder, two-
good model, originally developed by Burguet (1999).  In this model, each bidder has unit 
demand for one of the two goods and is equally likely to prefer either good.  As a result there is 
a fifty percent chance that both bidders will prefer the same good and a fifty percent chance that 
they will prefer different goods.  Payoff for the (dis)preferred good is 1(0).  The right to choose 
is offered in a sequence of two auction phases, and the bidder that wins the right in phase one is 
inactive in phase two.  In the second phase of the RTC a bidder that remains active has a fifty 
percent chance of receiving their preferred good.  Expected utility in phase 2, therefore, is  
 
      
 
      .  Given their phase 2 expectations, backwards induction implies bidders will not 
pay more than R in the first phase where  
  1     
1
2
  1   
1
2
  0  
Normalizing   1   1  and   0   0  yields   1     
 
 , and with   ·   concave,   
 
  .    
Thus, when bidders are risk-averse, the RTC institution raises more revenue than the SEQ 
alternative in which expected revenues are equal to 
 
  (Burguet 1999, 2007).
8   
       Intuitively, the possibility that one’s preferred good will be chosen early makes the value of 
the later auctions less certain.  Risk-averse buyers are therefore willing to pay a premium to 
secure their favored good in an early round.   As a consequence, the RTC auction creates 
competition across goods that individually may have relatively thin markets. In the context of 
the water market study, increased revenues in the RTC auction imply that the water “types” are 
in fact perceived as distinct goods, and that attempts to aggregate goods into a thicker market 
would be unsuccessful.   
The bulk of the evidence on the performance of the RTC relative to the SEQ comes from 
laboratory experiments using induced values.  Goeree, Plott, and Wooders (2004) conduct 
experiments with two goods and 4 bidders in each auction and find higher revenues in the RTC 
than in the SEQ.  They estimate a model that assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
and find that it yields a significantly better fit to the data than a risk-neutral model.  Eliaz, 
                                                 
8 Methods for breaking revenue equivalence in the risk-neutral setting have been examined by Eliaz, Offerman, and 
Schotter (2008).  Withholding information about which good is sold in a particular phase, and selling only a subset 
of the available goods are two approaches they explore.     10
Offerman, and Schotter (2008) also find overbidding in the RTC, however, in a novel treatment 
in which information about which good is chosen is not revealed, behavior inconsistent with risk 
aversion is observed.   Their “no information right-to-choose” (NIRTC) treatment creates a 
lottery in which risk-averse bidders should bid less than the SEQ benchmark after the first 
auction phase.  Since the NIRTC outperforms the SEQ in their study, the authors seek an 
alternative to risk aversion to explain their data.  They argue that their results are better 
understood by assuming that bidders overestimate the extent of competition for their preferred 
good, an argument consistent with reports from professional auctioneers.  In both of the 
published studies, the empirical analysis imposes a common risk parameter across the pool of 
bidders, an assumption inconsistent with the experimental evidence (see e.g. Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström 2007).   One contribution of the current study is that it addresses the heterogeneity of 
risk preferences by eliciting individual attitudes to risk that can be used as control variables in 
econometric estimates of bid functions.  
To our knowledge, only one other experimental study of the RTC institution has been 
conducted in a field setting.  Alevy and Price (2009) compared RTC and SEQ institutions, 
auctioning consumer goods that included iPods, hiking equipment, and fine wines.  Contrary to 
the laboratory results, aggregate bids and revenues did not differ across the two auction 
institutions in their study.  Summarizing across experimental studies, there does not appear to be 
a strong consensus on the impact of risk aversion on bidding behavior.  However, we believe 
that the use of risk and time preference elicitations in the current study will shed fresh light on 
the question.   .   
 
Subject Pool and Experimental Design  
 
The experimental auctions for water were conducted with farm owners in the Limarí Valley 
in the city of Ovalle on August 22
nd 2008.  Ovalle is the largest city in the valley, centrally 
located and frequently visited by our subject population due to the input and output markets, and 
the financial services that are available in the city.  Forty-nine farmers attended the session and 
bids were received from forty-one.  To accomplish the objective of eliciting real WTP for water 
from the farmers, the research team purchased water in advance from two water user 
associations and then offered the water for sale in the auctions.  The session took approximately 
4 hours and included a lunch served to the participants.      11
The RTC and SEQ institutions were studied with a between-subjects design.  Before salient 
bids for water were requested, subjects were split into two groups and each was introduced to 
the specific auction institution they would be using.  Training auctions were conducted in which 
items that included pens, calculators and calendars were sold in distinct phases using procedures 
identical to those in the water auctions.  All auctions were “hand-run” with written bids 
collected in each auction phase.  The person submitting the highest bid was awarded either the 
specific good for sale (SEQ), or the right-to-choose their preferred good from among those 
remaining (RTC), and was required to pay the second highest submitted bid.  
In each auction treatment four goods were sold in four separate bidding phases.  In each 
phase the good consisted of 1,000 cubic meters of water and the four alternatives varied by 
source and by the timing of the acquisition.  The goods included (i) 1,000 cubic meters from the 
Cogoti reservoir available the business day following the auction, (ii) 1,000 cubic meters from 
the Cogoti reservoir available 30 calendar days after the auction, (iii) 1,000 cubic meters from 
the Camarico reservoir available the business day following the auction, and (iv) 1,000 cubic 
meters from the Camarico reservoir available 30 calendar days after the auction (see also Table 
1).   In addition to the auctions, the session included auxiliary protocols to elicit risk and time 
preferences for each subject.  A short survey to gather information on demographic attributes 
and on market experience was also conducted.  Table 2 provides an overview of the sequencing 
of tasks in the experimental session.  
The elicitation of risk and time preferences made use of the multiple price list (MPL) 
methodology (Andersen et al. 2008; see also instructions in appendix).  Time preferences were 
elicited over three different periods, (i) 0-30 days, (ii) 30-60 days and (iii) 0-60 days for cash 
payments that ranged from 5400 to 7600 Chilean Pesos and using 10 questions in each series.
9  
One of the thirty questions selected at random for each subject, and they were paid according to 
the preferences expressed in the selected question.   Those receiving payments on day zero were 
paid in cash at the end of the experimental session.  For those receiving payments thirty or sixty 
days in the future, arrangements were made for payments to be available at the offices of the 
appropriate WUAs.  The results from time preference elicitation (ii) are used as a control 
variable in the regression analysis, below.  Series (ii) is used since the payment methodology - 
through the WUAs - is constant for both dates in the elicitation. Thus, the time preferences are 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate on the day the experiments were conducted was 520 Chilean Pesos per U.S. Dollar.   12
not confounded by differences in transaction costs associated with the different methods used to 
distribute the funds.   
Risk preferences were elicited from two MPL sequences, each containing ten questions.  In 
one, the lottery outcomes consisted of cash payments and in the other the outcomes were in 
water volumes.  The lottery payoffs over water volumes were parameterized to be similar in 
expected value to the cash payoffs using the prices at which the research team purchased the 
water on the day prior to the research session.
10  The order of presentation of the two lists was 
counterbalanced across the subject pool.   The values used in the risk and time elicitations are in 




Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables from the auxiliary 
protocols that elicit individual bidder’s risk and time preferences.  Using nonparametric tests we 
fail to reject the null hypotheses that central tendencies and the shape of the distributions are the 
same across the RTC and SEQ treatments.
11    We also fail to reject the null hypothesis of risk 
neutrality for the population as a whole, based on a test of means.  However, we do observe 
significant heterogeneity across individuals. Figure 1 presents the distribution of risk preferences 
and Figure 2 the distribution of time preferences, which is bimodal.  
  Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the auction bids, distinguishing bidding 
behavior by auction type and by rank order of preference for the goods.  On average, bids are 
34.82 pesos per cubic meter in the RTC auction and 9.44 pesos per cubic meter in the SEQ 
institution.  Statistical tests confirm that bids are significantly higher in the RTC institution in 
aggregate and for each preference ranking of the goods.    
To better understand the consequences of the two different auction institutions on we 
estimate a model of bidding behavior as a function of the auction treatment, explanatory 
variables and relevant interactions. For some agents the optimal choice is to bid an amount equal 
to 0, i.e., a corner solution for a subset of the goods. The bidding behavior suggests the use of a 
                                                 
10 Differences in elicited attitudes across the cash and water media, are examined in Alevy, Cristi, and Melo (2010).  
11 P-values for the Wilcoxon test of central tendencies for risk (time) preferences are p = 0.54 (p = 0.69), and for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the shape of the distribution p = 0.97 (p = 0.88)   13
Tobit model, which allows for that type of corner solution and insures that predicted values of 
bids are always non-negative (Wooldrige 2001, p.518).  
Thus our statistical problem takes the form of: 
it it i it yv 
   x β  
  max 0, it it yy
   
where  it y
  is a  latent variable,   it y is the bid of individual i in auction phase  t,    it x is a set of 
exogenous variables that explain the bidding behavior which includes the experimental 
treatment dummies, and  β is a vector of unknown parameters.  We estimate an error-
components model because of the repeated observations on bidders across auction phases.  Thus 
the component  i v  is the random disturbance characterizing the ith individual and is constant 
across auction phases. The component  it   is a random disturbance that varies across individuals 
and across auction phases.  We assume that  i v  and  it   both are distributed normally with mean 
value 0 and constant variance 
2
u   and 
2
   respectively. We assume further that   0 it j Ev     for 
all i, t and j;  0 it js E      if ts  or ij  ; and that  0 ij Ev v    if  ij  . 
Table 6 presents Tobit estimates for two models of bidding behavior.  Model 1 includes 
an indicator variable for the auction institution, RTC, which is 1 (0) for the RTC (SEQ) 
institution, and for each good in order of bidder preference (Prefx, where    1,2,3,4  indicates 
the preference ranking), and interactions of the auction institution and the Prefx variables.  The 
use of the preference ranking as an explanatory variable, rather than the specific good, is driven 
by the theoretical model which assumes heterogeneity of preferences and therefore that bids for 
different goods in the same phase of the RTC drive the differences across institutions.  This 
heterogeneity is in fact observed in the auction data.   
Model 2 adds several explanatory variables to the Model 1 specification. The categorical 
variable for risk attitude, risk, ranges from 0 to 10 and is increasing with risk aversion.  The 
value represents the number of times the safe lottery (Lottery A) is chosen in the ten question 
risk elicitation protocol.  Time preference (time) is defined similarly, with the value representing 
the number of times the ‘early’ (Choice A) is chosen.  We also include an indicator for market 
experience, which takes the value of 1 (0) if the subject has (has not) ever participated in the 
spot market for water as a buyer.  The variable risk is also interacted with the RTC indicator   14
variable, in Model 2, since theory suggests risk attitude has different effects in the two 
institutions.  We also examine the impacts of time both directly on bidding behavior, and 
interacted with an indicator variable (now) that takes on the values of 1 (0) for goods available 
today (in 30 days).   
Model 1 yields insights similar to those gleaned from the tabulated data in Table 5; it 
provides evidence that bids are dramatically higher in the RTC institution, with the RTC 
coefficient equal to 48.28 (p < 0.0001).
12  In addition, we find that subjects had similar values 
for their two most preferred goods.  Evidence for this finding arises from the coefficient for 
Pref2 which, both on its own and when interacted with RTC is found to be not significantly 
different from zero, and thus bids do not differ significantly from the omitted category of the 
most preferred good.  Bids decline substantially for the less preferred goods (Pref3 and Pref4) in 
both auction institutions, reinforcing the finding of heterogeneity in preferences.  
Model 2 sheds light on the underlying factors associated with the observed outcomes and 
on the theoretical propositions outlined in section 3.  We find that the risk variable does not have 
a direct effect in our model as the coefficient (-1.41) is not statistically significant (p = 0.65).  
However, when interacted with the RTC institution, there is a large and statistically significant 
effect.  The coefficient of RTC x risk is 8.80 (p = 0.02).  Thus for the median level of risk 
aversion in the sample, (median risk = 5) we find bids more than 40 pesos per cubic meter 
higher in the RTC treatment.    Time preferences also have significant effect on bids with a 
marginal increase in time leading to a fall in bids by 2.97 pesos per cubic meter (p = 0.02).  This 
effect is moderated for the subset of goods available for immediate purchase, with the 
coefficient on the interaction of now x time equal to 0.82 (p = 0.06) and the net effect still 
negative as determined by a Wald test in which the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero is rejected (p = 0.09).   Thus, those with higher discount rates have lower 
willingness-to-pay for goods regardless of the date of availability, with the effect moderated, but 
not eliminated, for goods available immediately.  Finally, we note that those with experience as 
buyers in the spot market bid significantly more for water than their inexperienced colleagues 
(coefficient on experience = 17.17, p = 0.07).   
                                                 
12 Bidders who submitted any positive bids are included in our sample and we report marginal effects for the latent 
variable.   Other models that restrict the sample to positive bids yield similar conclusions.    15
The key substantive finding from Model 2 is that, after adding the control variables, the 
RTC indicator is substantially smaller (5.03) and no longer statistically significant (p = 0.79).  
Thus the differences in bidding behavior between the two auction institutions are explained by 
the controls we introduce in the model.  Risk attitudes play the largest role in explaining the 
results and thus our results provide additional support for Burguet’s theory (2007).  Market 
experience also plays an important role.  However, caution is required in interpreting the effect,   
since experience serves as proxy for variables associated with farm production practices that are 
correlated with higher values for water.  Thus, while we might expect those who have been in 
the market to be willing to pay more for water relative to those who have not, the magnitude of 
the premium is somewhat surprising. The average bid of the experienced buyers reflects a price 
68% higher than the price paid by the research team the previous day.  The lack of censoring at 
market price suggests that under the existing institution of bilateral negotiation, information on 
prices is not widely dispersed, even among those who have participated in the market in the past.  
Thus it seems likely that an alternative institution, in which prices are publicly announced, could 
play an important role in price discovery.    
 
Conclusion  
The functioning of the spot market for water volumes in the Paloma System was studied 
using field experimental techniques.  Willingness-to-pay for water of distinct types was elicited 
from farmers in both sequential and right-to-choose auction institutions.  We find strong 
evidence in this setting that risk attitudes explain a substantial portion of the difference between 
the two auction institutions, lending support to the theory of Burguet (2007).  Our results thus 
extend a literature that has relied primarily on induced values, by working with field context and 
homegrown values.  We also relax the assumption of risk preference homogeneity, and directly 
elicit heterogeneous risk attitudes.  The results on risk are consistent with the results of Cristi 
(2007) who found that heterogeneity of risk preferences were important in motivating 
participation in the spot market.  Our results contrast with the earlier field study of Alevy and 
Price (2009) and the cause of these differences is an area for further research.  
Our findings have implications for policy proposals aimed at improving market 
functioning in the Limarí Valley.  The competition across goods engendered by the right-to-
choose auction clearly indicates that specific characteristics are important to buyers and access   16
to contracts with temporal and spatial variability is likely to improve the functioning of the 
market.  The finding that participants with market experience were willing to pay a substantial 
premium over current market prices deserves additional study.  In combination with the volatile 
prices observed in previous empirical studies, it suggests that there may be opportunities to 
increase market efficiency through formalizing and modernizing exchange mechanisms, and 
publicizing market prices.  
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Same day, Cogoti 
Good 2 
30 days, Cogoti 
  
 Good  3 
Same day, Camarico 
Good 4 
30 days, Camarico 
  
In all cases the volume of water is 1,000 cubic meters. 
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Table 2: Order of Activity in the Experimental Session 
Session Activity  Subject Tasks 
Time-Preference Elicitation  3 MPL choice tasks 
Risk Preference Elicitation  2 MPL choice tasks 
Auction   3 good training & 4 good water auction
Determine Payments for auxiliary protocols  
Survey   
Settlement of water contracts and payment of subjects Session Close
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Table 3: Risk and Time Preference Elicitation Questions 
 
Panel A  Risk Preference Questions 
Question  Lottery A  Lottery B 
1  .1, 1400  .9, 900  .1, 2500  .9, 250 
2  .2, 1400  .8, 900  .2, 2500  .8, 250 
3  .3, 1400  .7, 900  .3, 2500  .7, 250 
4  .4, 1400  .6, 900  .4, 2500  .6, 250 
5  .5, 1400  .5, 900  .5, 2500  .5, 250 
6  .6, 1400  .4, 900  .6, 2500  .4, 250 
7  .7, 1400  .3, 900  .7, 2500  .3, 250 
8  .8, 1400  .2, 900  .8, 2500  .2, 250 
9  .9, 1400  .1, 900  .9, 2500  .1, 250 
10  1.0, 1400  0.0, 900  1.0, 2500 0.0, 250
Each cell presents the probability and the payoff for a component of a lottery. Payoff amounts 
are in cubic meters of water.  The risk variable is a count of the number of choices of Lottery A. 
 
 
Panel B  Time Preference Questions 
Question  A: Payment in 30 Days   B: Payment in 60 Days
1 5400  5490 
2 5400  5580 
3 5400  5670 
4 5400  5760 
5 5400  5850 
6 5400  5940 
7 5400  6030 
8 5400  6120 
9 5400  6210 
10 5400  6300 
Payment amounts are in Chilean Pesos. The exchange rate for U.S. dollars was 520 pesos per 
U.S. dollar at the time of the experimental session. The time variable is a count of the number A 
choices.    20
Table 4: Risk and Time Preference Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A  Risk Preference Results
Auction Treatment  Mean  SDev  Median 
SEQ 3.87  1.92  4 
RTC 4.18  2.49  5 
Total 4.00  2.17  5 
 
 
Panel B  Time Preference Results
Auction Treatment  Mean  SDev  Median 
SEQ 5.50  3.38  6 
RTC 4.93  3.87  5 
Total 5.27  3.59  5 
Cell values represent number of A choices in the risk or time elicitation protocol. Choices are 
displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 5: Auction Bidding Descriptive Statistics 
   Pref 1  Pref 2 Pref 3 Pref 4 Aggregate 
Auction  Mean  SD  Mean  SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD 
SEQ  17.72  25.55  12.50  22.80 6.00 12.19 1.55 3.07 9.44  18.90 
RTC  51.29  37.86  43.95  34.72 25.43 32.35 18.62 28.87 34.82  35.60 
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Notes: Variable values represent the number of safe choices made in the water lottery treatment.  A total of four 
safe choices are consistent with risk neutrality. The median number of safe choices is 5.  







0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Number of 'Safe' Choices
Risk Preference Elicitation
Density  24
Figure 2: Distribution of Time Preference Elicitation Results 
 
 
Notes: Variable values represent the number of choices indicating a preference for the early payout.  The median 
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Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions 
Experimental Instructions - Risk elicitation 
 
Record your subject number on your decision sheet. Your decision sheet shows ten decisions 
listed on the left.  Each decision is a paired choice between OPTION A and OPTION B.  You 
will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used in 
the end to determine your earnings.  Before you start making your ten choices, please let me 
explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
We will use part of a deck of cards to determine payoffs; cards 2-10 and the Ace will represent 
“1”.  After you have made all of your choices, we will randomly select a card twice, once to 
select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is 
for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. (After the first card is 
selected, it will be put back in the pile, the deck will be reshuffled, and the second card will be 
drawn).  Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your 
earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used.  Obviously, each 
decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top.  OPTION A pays $2.800 if the Ace is selected, and it 
pays $2.200 if the card selected is 2-10.  OPTION B yields $5.000 if the Ace is selected, and it 
pays $500 if the card selected is 2-10.  The other decisions are similar, except that as you move 
down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase.  In fact, for Decision 
10 in the bottom row, the cards will not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for 
sure, so your choice here is between $2.800 or $5.000. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose 
between OPTION A and OPTION B.  You may choose A for some decision rows and B for 
other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  When you are 
finished with Part II of the experiment, we will come to your desk and pick a card to determine 
which of the ten decisions will be used.  Then we will put the card back in the deck, shuffle, 
and select a card again to determine your money earnings for the OPTION you chose for that 
decision.  Earnings for this choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be 
paid all earnings in cash when we finish. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet.  You will have to 
write a decision, A or B in each of these boxes, and then the card selection will determine 
which one is going to count.  We will look at the decision that you made for the choice that 
counts, and circle it, before selecting a card again to determine your earnings for this part.  
Then you will write your earnings in the blank at the bottom of the page. 
Are there any questions?  Now you may begin making your choices.  Please do not talk with 
anyone else while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question. 
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(Circle A or B)
1 
$2.800 if card is Ace 
$2.200 if card is 2-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace  
$500 if card is 2-10 
A       B 
2 
$2.800 if card is Ace-2  
$2.200 if card is 3-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-2  
$500 if card is 3-10  
A       B 
3 
$2.800 if card is Ace-3  
$2.200 if card is 4-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-3  
$500 if card is 4-10  
A       B 
4 
$2.800 if card is Ace-4  
$2.200 if card is 5-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-4  
$500 if card is 5-10  
A       B 
5 
$2.800 if card is Ace-5  
$2.200 if card is 6-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-5  
$500 if card is 6-10  
A       B 
6 
$2.800 if card is Ace-6  
$2.200 if card is 7-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-6  
$500 if card is 7-10  
A       B 
7 
$2.800 if card is Ace-7  
$2.200 if card is 8-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-7  
$500 if card is 8-10  
A       B 
8 
$2.800 if card is Ace-8  
$2.200 if card is 9-10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-8  
$500 if card is 9-10  
A       B 
9 
$2.800 if card is Ace-9  
$2.200 if card is 10  
$5.000 if card is Ace-9  
$500 if card is 10  
A       B 




FIRST CARD – TO SELECT DECISION ROW: _________ 
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Experimental Instructions RTC Auction  
 
 
Welcome.  Today you have the opportunity to bid in an auction where we will be selling the 
goods described below   If you have a question at any time during the session, please raise your 




Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Camario, today 
Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Camario, in a month 
Good 1: 1.000 cubic meters of water from Cogotí, today 




Explanation of the auction 
 
The auction consists of four phases.   In every phase, instead of selling a specific good, we will 
sell the right-to-choose one of the goods.  
The highest bidder in every phase wins and chooses their preferred good from among those that 
remain.  
At the end of the first three phases every buyer will be informed about the goods that have been 
selected and what remain available.  
In the final phase (4), all the buyers offer a price for the only good that remains. 
 
The auction price 
 
In every phase you should bid a price that corresponds to the maximum that you are willing to pay for 
acquiring the right to choose. The offered prices can be of any total in intervals of 10 pesos. For example: 
10, 20, 100, 110. In addition to the price you must indicate the good that you want to choose if you win.  
 
Once each of the buyers has entered his price, all prices will be ordered from largest to smallest to 
determine which buyer obtains the right to choose. 
 
Important: the price that the winner of every phase pays is not the price that he bid, but the value of the 
second highest bid in that phase. .   
.   
If you do not win the right to choose, you do not have to pay anything.   
 
If there is a tie for the highest bid, the winner will be chosen by means of a coin flip. In this case the 
winner will pay a price equal to his bid, since it is also the second highest price.  
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Example: suppose that the following goods are offered for sale 
(i)  A bicycle 
(ii) A computer 
(iii) A chair  
 





















Buyer 4 wins the right to choose his preferred good, in this case the computer. The price that he will pay 
is equal at the second highest price, that is to say: 36,000 pesos.   
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In the second phase the process repeats and every buyer offers a price for the goods that remain. The 











Who is the winner? 
 
Please write down on your sheet the ID of the winner and the price he/she pays in this example 
 
Result:  
Buyer 3 gains the right to choose his preferred good in this case, the chair. The price that he will pay is 
equal to the second highest price: 35,000 pesos.   
 
 
 
 